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I. Introduction
The transition to a market economy by the countries of Eastern Europe
and the former Soviet Union has been a dramatic move from a relatively
stable economic condition with equal income distribution to one with un-
certainty, political and economical instability, and sharp polarization in
resource distribution. The sweeping economic reforms have led the Rus-
sian Federation to eliminate most, if not all, general subsidies and sig-
nificantly reduce subsidies and payments to the poor. The privatization
of many activities and the process of allowing prices and exchange rates
to fluctuate caused rapid economic and social changes. Since the onset
of the economic transition, the establishment of a social safety net and
the need to mitigate the social costs associated with the transition from a
planned state economy to a market-oriented economy have been a major
concern in the countries of the former Soviet Union. The political sup-
port of reforms in these countries after the end of communism and the
question of political stability become vital to their governments. Poverty
and inequality are among the factors that determine the distribution of
political power. As A. B. Atkinson and J. Micklewright note, ‘‘The legit-
imacy of governments may be called into question if too large a gap
opens between rich and poor.’’1
We use seven rounds of longitudinal data to examine this economic
transformation and its social consequences with respect to poverty. We
show that new population groups with totally different standards of liv-
ing are surfacing. On one end are the Russian capitalists, so-called new
Russians, who enjoy a high standard of living, even for developed coun-
tries. At the other end, a significant proportion of the population survives
on income close to the subsistence level. The notion of a culture of pov-
erty, widely used in Western economic literature, and the concept of an
underclass appear to be emerging. This study shows the income dynam-
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ics that have arisen provides some sense of who constitutes this emerg-
ing underclass and presents evidence of the seriously misleading results
associated with a cross-sectional analysis of poverty in this region.
To date, most analyses of the social dimensions of this transforma-
tion have been based on cross-sectional information and have been un-
able to answer the relevant questions regarding the social costs of the
transitions.2 Only recently in Western Europe and the United States have
longitudinal data sets become available for research. The Panel Study of
Income Dynamics launched in the United States in 1968, the German
Socio-Economic Panel started in 1984, and the British Household Panel
Study of 1988 are examples of longitudinal data studies. Based on these
and other panels, scientists have begun to gain new insights into the pat-
terns, causes, and consequences of poverty. Scholars increasingly have
shown that time must be accounted for in the study of poverty. The pre-
vailing view on poverty as a static phenomenon based on an assumption
that the poor are behaviorally separate from the rest of society has led to
an oversimplification of the nature of poverty. Consequently, it is com-
monly held that ‘‘the majority of the poor today walks along economic
paths that are familiar to their parents and which, most probably, will be
trodden by most of their children as adults and parents in the future.’’3
This study of Russian poverty shows the opposite. While there is
an emerging underclass, most periods of poverty are relatively short.
Though only a small percentage of Russian families stay poor all their
lives, this underclass must be carefully understood.
As we show for Russia, poverty can no longer be considered by us-
ing a static method that divides families into categories of poor and non-
poor. Instead, poverty should be studied from a dynamic perspective that
recognizes that periods of poverty are finite. This approach allows the
more appropriate linkage of macro- and microeconomic analyses of pov-
erty and the development of an understanding of the causal roles played
by structural and personal characteristics. Moreover, different policies
may be needed to address transitory and long-term poverty problems.
II. Methods
The Data
The Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS), the first and only
nationally representative sample of households in the Russian Federa-
tion, provides the basis for this research. The survey comprises seven
rounds conducted in September 1992 (round 1), February 1993 (round
2), August 1993 (round 3), November 1993 (round 4), December 1994
(round 5), October 1995 (round 6), and October 1996 (round 7). Over
6,000 households were surveyed in phase 1 (rounds 1–4), while approxi-
mately 4,000 households from a different panel were surveyed in phase
2 (rounds 5–7). The data were weighted across the rounds to ensure
comparability.
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Faculty at the Carolina Population Center at the University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC–CH) have headed this effort. Phase 1 data
were collected by the State Statistical Office (Goskomstat) of the Russian
Federation in collaboration with the Russian Center for Preventive Medi-
cine, the Institute of Sociology, Russian Academy of Sciences, and Para-
gon Research International. Phase 2 was carried out with a new set of
families, in collaboration with the Institute of Sociology, Russian Acad-
emy of Sciences, the Institute of Nutrition, Russian Academy of Medical
Sciences, and Paragon Research International.4
The initial sample of households for phase 1 of the survey was iden-
tified from a stratified three–stage cluster sample of residential ad-
dresses. Cities as well as urban and rural portions of rayons (political
and geographic units about the size of counties in the United States) were
the area units selected in the first stage. Probability proportionate to size
(PPS) sampling was used to select the rayons. The rayons were stratified
by the eight regions and by the percentage of the urban population within
each region. Within each area chosen in the first stage, a sample of 10
voting districts was randomly chosen, again by PPS systematic selection,
from a geographically ordered list of voting districts located in that area.
Finally, within the boundaries of each selected voting district, a list of
dwellings and households was developed by the UNC-CH team using
visual inspection, based on lists that included addresses (such as voting
lists) only as an initial guide. Adjustments were made for communal
apartments and adult dormitories, where many households share one ad-
dress. From the list of households, a systematic sample of 20 was drawn.
The second phase of the survey (1994–96) followed similar
multistage clustering. The first cluster included three self-represented ur-
ban regions and 35 other primary sampling units (PSUs). According to
the sampling researchers involved in these designs, the second phase had
about 65 PSUs while the first phase had only 20. Thus, there was consid-
erably more clustering in the first phase. The procedures for selecting
secondary sampling units and households were similar in the two phases,
except that in the second phase census lists were used as a first step in
which more detailed mapping and checks were implemented at the local
level to collect the final lists of households. From phase 1, 3,763 families
are represented in all four rounds. For the second phase, the number of
families interviewed in three rounds was 2,887.
Methodology: Measures and Definitions
Total household income. Total monthly disposable household income
is used in the analysis. It includes wages and salaries, social security
transfers, private transfers, in-kind income, and income from home pro-
duction. No attempt has been made to estimate the value of subsidies to
housing and utilities. Great care was taken to collect comparable mea-
sures of income over all rounds of the RLMS. The focus is on total
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household income because poverty is defined in Russia, as in most coun-
tries, on the basis of household welfare.
The poverty line. The Russian Federation has adopted a measure
of poverty comparable to that of the United States. That is, a food basket
based on nutritional criteria is developed for each age-gender group. This
basket is priced out, and the average propensity to purchase food is used
to increase this cost to the overall poverty line for each age-gender
group. The cutoff for poverty is based on a level of nutritional intake re-
quirements defined by the World Health Organization and Food and Agri-
culture Organization and adjusted slightly for the Russian Federation.
Studies of poverty in Russia have a long tradition. Most have fo-
cused on a minimum budget and subsistence wage or similar measures
of minimum levels of living.5 In the mid-1950s, under the Khrushchev
government, a minimum subsistence level measured by the Family Bud-
get Surveys of the Goskomstat was used.6 This measure used an abso-
lute-income-level index based on a large basket of goods and services
ranging from food to items such as holidays. The minimum subsistence
level related more to a consumption norm than a poverty index and in-
deed the term ‘‘poverty’’ (bednost) was not used until the dissolution
of the USSR and the construction of the Western-style subsistence-level
poverty line that is used here.
We use the official poverty line of the Russian Federation, a food
basket developed for a set of age-gender groupings for all regions in the
country.7 The critique that could be raised against this method is that the
use of national average prices and constant food baskets fails to capture
regional adjustments and compositional adjustments through relative
price changes. Recently the government has begun work to incorporate
regional adjustments in this food basket, which we do not use. However,
economy-of-scale adjustments developed as part of this recent work are
incorporated.8
Measures of persistent and transitory poverty. Moving from static
to dynamic analyses of poverty in Russia requires the use of measures
that will reflect dynamic components of poverty such as the duration of
a poverty spell and household-income dynamics. This study focuses on
the most widely used approach to measuring persistent and transitory
poverty.9 This method uses a share of the population with income below
the poverty threshold in x out of n time periods to estimate chronic pov-
erty, and it is highly sensitive to the length of the observation period. As
the period is lengthened, there is an increasingly reduced chronic poverty
segment. In addition, there are censoring problems.10 Data do not allow
one to determine when a poverty spell actually began. However, the
RLMS data sets are unique in that the first wave of the survey was
launched shortly after the economic reform process began in Russia.
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This marked the beginning of almost all poverty spells. There is potential
for some censoring since a lower level of poverty did exist prior to the
1992 economic reforms.11 Consequently, the chronic poverty measure
slightly underestimates the real proportion of the persistently poor be-
cause people whose poverty spells started before the beginning of the
time series and people whose spells started in the middle of the survey
are not included in the chronically poor group.
This approach uses the strength of the survey data to provide some
sense of the shifts going on in the Russian Federation. We do not have
adequate information to understand poverty spells fully.12
Classification of families into poverty categories. For each of the
first four rounds of the RLMS, there are 16 different possible classifica-
tions for each family in the sample. Families are classified as never poor,
poor for one round, poor for some combination of two or three of the
rounds, or poor for all four rounds of phase 1. Similarly in phase 2, there
are three rounds, and families are classified as never poor, poor for one
round, poor for two rounds, or poor for all three rounds. In addition, we
differentiate between households classified as never poor and all house-
holds whose income rose above the poverty line for at least one round.
This allows us to understand another dimension of Russian income dy-
namics—the emergence of a wealthy group.
Thus, based on the categorizations above, we label a family as per-
sistently poor if their income lies below the poverty line for all rounds
of phase 1 and phase 2. Families are defined as persistently rich when
their income is greater than two times the designated poverty line for all
rounds of the RLMS. As noted above, there will be fewer chronically
poor families in phase 1 since the period of coverage is longer.
In following this approach, we are very much in the tradition initi-
ated by Greg J. Duncan and others. As noted by Duncan et al., ‘‘Above
all, the static dichotomy of ’poor’ versus ’non poor’ is very misleading
and needs to be replaced by at least four dynamic categories of economic
position—persistent poverty, transitional poverty, the economically vul-
nerable, and the financially secure.’’13
III. Income and Income Inequality Dynamics
Four dynamic aspects of poverty are critical for understanding the struc-
ture of Russian poverty: the degree of income inequality within the poor
subsample, the duration of a poverty spell, the difference in absolute in-
come among poverty groups, and income variability for every category.
Income Inequality
Unequal income distribution among the poor provides a strong indication
of their heterogeneity of well-being. We begin with an analysis of the
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Fig. 1.—Gini coefficient for families with income below the poverty line
and for the entire Russian population, RLMS rounds 1–4 (September 1992–Oc-
tober 1996).
distribution of absolute income in relation to the poverty line for the Rus-
sian poor. We conclude this section with an analysis of variation in in-
come of poor Russian households as a measure of stability of income for
different categories of Russian families.
Gini coefficients are used to demonstrate the shift in income in-
equality in Russia during the period covered by the RLMS. The polariza-
tion of income for the total population and for the poor is presented in
figure 1. Income inequality is very high for the total Russian population
and there was a Gini ratio of about .49 in 1996. The level of income
inequality for poor households is high and is associated with a high
within-group income variability.
Income Dynamics
Figure 2 shows the distribution of Russian households by type of income
dynamics for phases 1 and 2 of the RLMS. Almost half the Russian fam-
ilies (48.8%) in phase 1 (rounds 1–4) stayed above the poverty line for
the full 14 months of survey coverage. These families, which we desig-
nate as never poor, are Duncan’s economically secure. More than 8%
had an income at least double the poverty line. These numbers are com-
parable with the results from the second panel of the survey that spanned
23 months (33.5% and 14.1%, respectively).
We also find that a significant percentage of the population experi-
enced poverty at least once during the period covered. The structure of
Fig. 2.—Distribution of Russian families by type of income dynamics: (a)
RLMS rounds 1–4 (September 1992–November 1993); (b) rounds 5–7 (Decem-
ber 1994–October 1996).
809
810 Economic Development and Cultural Change
poverty is highly heterogeneous. The income of a large percentage of
poor households (48.0% of the universe of poor households) dropped be-
low the poverty line only once in rounds 1–4. These are the occasionally
poor14 or economically vulnerable.15 Transitionally poor families are
those that experienced poverty twice during phase 1. Thus, 28.3% of
poor families fall into this category. We designate the 15.4% of the fami-
lies whose income was above the poverty line only once during phase 1
as recurrently poor. Finally, only 8.2% of the poor were persistently poor
during all four rounds between September 1992 and November 1993.
The more recent data from phase 2 of the RLMS confirm these re-
sults. In this phase, transitionally poor families have an income above
the poverty level for only one of three rounds, and the recurrently poor
category is dropped. Although the group of persistently poor is larger
(13.3% of the total poor sample), some of these families would not be
in this category had we had more time periods in the second sample. In
rounds 5, 6, and 7 of the RLMS, 55.6% of poor families were occasion-
ally poor.
Difference in Absolute Income
The next point is to understand the income shares of these groupings rel-
ative to the poverty line. Living on an income permanently below the
poverty line is difficult, but there are also important issues related to the
severity of poverty. Who suffers the most? What groups are most vulner-
able and need greater protection? To answer these questions, we examine
the income distribution among different classes of the poor.
Figure 3 shows the proportion of income for each demographic
grouping of the rich and the poor relative to the poverty line. This sup-
ports the common opinion that people who are persistently poor suffer
the most. These families not only experience longer poverty spells, but
their income is significantly lower than that of other households. The
persistently poor from both phases of the survey survived on an income
of almost half the minimum subsistence level and would be termed poor
under most definitions. For example, the permanent-income approach,
which takes into account the possibility for a family to save and borrow,
would still put the household in the same category. Their income-to-
needs ratio would be without a doubt lower than unity.
The recurrently poor in phase 1 have an average income per period
that is below the poverty line. In contrast, the occasionally and transition-
ally poor have experienced some economic hardship, but their overall
income reserves allow them to smooth out the occasional drops in their
economic well-being. Average income for the occasionally poor was
slightly above the poverty line. The same is not expected for the persis-
tently and recurrently poor. In phase 2, those who were poor in three
rounds are the only group with an income deficit.
Fig. 3.—Income as a share of Russian family poverty line distribution cate-
gorized by type of income dynamics: (a) RLMS rounds 1–4 (September 1992–
November 1993); (b) rounds 5–7 (December 1994–October 1996).
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Income Variation
Being poor means different things for families with different degrees of
economic mobility. The duration of a poverty spell and absolute income
depend on the shifts over time in income relative to the poverty line. As
we show in figure 4, income variability is much smaller for the persis-
tently poor and the very rich. Those who are poor transitionally or occa-
sionally have much greater income variability as shown in the coefficient
of variation.
Most of the income variation was experienced by transitionally and
recurrently poor families. Families with the higher levels of income vari-
ation have the highest probability of changing their income status by
moving from one category to another. For such families, the snapshot of
short-term income distribution can be totally different from the picture
of long-run economic conditions and opportunities. Finding the trigger
events that make households exit from or enter into poverty would pro-
vide the basis for a poverty-prevention policy. Such an analysis is be-
yond the scope of this article.
The relatively stable income of the persistently poor in phases 1 and
2 (38.3 and 47.97 coefficient of income variation, respectively) is a direct
indicator of the emerging Russian underclass (see fig. 4). Thus, the struc-
ture of Russian poverty can be characterized as essentially nonuniform.
This heterogeneity is reflected in several observations. First, income dis-
tribution within the group of poor is more unequal than within the gen-
eral population. Second, the duration of poverty spells varies among the
different categories of Russian poor. Third, income variation over time
for the households from the subgroups of poor is very different.
IV. The Poor, Who Are They?
The previous section gave some sense of the income distribution of the
poor and the volatility of income in the various clusters. In this section,
we examine whether the six groupings of families categorized by income
dynamics for rounds 1–4 and five groupings of families for rounds 5–7
are differentially associated with various social and economic indicators.
There are two main perspectives in exploring the problem. First, it is im-
portant to understand whether specific segments of the Russian popula-
tion are likely to experience different types of income dynamics. Second,
we wish to determine whether the different income dynamics groupings
can be distinguished in terms of the people affected. We use information
collected in round 1 of phase 1 and round 5 of phase 2 to investigate the
structural and individual composition of Russian poverty.
Most studies of poverty have found that the demographic (type of
family, level of education, and age of head of household) and spatial fac-
tors of poverty are associated. We use the longitudinal data of the RLMS
to study the multivariate relationships between the main factors that de-
termine the income status of Russian households.
Fig. 4.—Mean coefficient of family income variation across rounds, cate-
gorized by type of income dynamic: (a) RLMS rounds 1–4 (September 1992–
November 1993); (b) rounds 5–7 (December 1994–October 1996).
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Empirical Model
The basic model for our multivariate-income-dynamic analysis is
Yti 5 Xti β 1 ζti; t 5 2, . . . , Ti, i 5 2, . . . , N,
(1)
ζti 5 µ i 1 e ti 1 ν t,
where Yti is the dichotomous variable that assumes a value 1 if the house-
hold is in poverty in the period t and 0 if it is not, Xti is a 1 3 K vector
of independent variables that can vary over time, and β is the unknown
vector of coefficients that needs to be estimated. The disturbance term
ζ ti consists of three components: µ i represents the unobserved character-
istics that vary from household to household but are constant through
time—the so called individual-specific effects—ν t is the unobserved fac-
tor that varies with time but stays the same for all households in the sam-
ple, and eti represents unobserved characteristics that vary across the
households and through time. The assumption is made that µ and e are
identically distributed, mutually independent, random variables with
means equal to zero and standard deviations of σµ and σe, respectively.
We deal with the unobserved ‘‘time-specific’’ heterogeneity, that is,
with the correlation in the error terms associated with ν t by introducing
the set of dummy variables for every survey round. Equation (1) then
becomes
Yti 5 Xti β 1 Γt 1 ζti; t 5 1, 2, . . . , Ti, i 5 1, 2, . . . , N,
(2)
ζ ti 5 µ i 1 eti,
where Γt is a 1 3 (T 2 1) vector of time-dummy variables; Xti consists
of five dummy variables for each family demographic category, exclud-
ing the category ‘‘other’’; two dummy variables indicating the location
of the household, with the households from rural Russia as a reference
group; two dummy variables for different levels of education—high
school and technical and vocational education—excluding individuals
with a university degree; a continuous variable for household head’s age;
a dummy variable indicating the household head’s employment status;
and a set of variables for interactions among the main parameters.
For several reasons, the random-effects-probit model is used for the
estimation of the coefficients in equation (2). First, we can argue that
most of the independent variables in equation (2) were considered exoge-
nous in previous cross-sectional studies. Thus, an assumption of no cor-
relation between the explanatory variables and the error term is valid for
our case.16 Next, the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable makes
it difficult to use the fixed-effect method since extensions of the fixed-
effect estimator to the probit model or other dichotomous dependent-
variable models were not very satisfactory.17
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The random-effects-probit model is a maximum-likelihood function
method applicable under the assumption of the normal distribution of the
error term ζti. The observed dependent variable Yti that represents the
poverty status of the household in period t is defined by the following
system of equations:
Yti 5 50 if Y*ti # Li1 if Y*ti . Li, (3)
where Yti is the total household income in period t and Li is the house-





, ρ 5 σ
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(σ 2µ 1 σ 2e)






hY*ti 5 hBti 1 3 ρ1 2 ρ4
2.5
µ i 1 he ti.
The conditional probability of being poor at time period t was shown to
be:18
P(Yti 5 0 |µ i) 5 Φti 5 Φ12 hBti 2 3 ρ1 2 ρ4
2.5
µ i2, (5)
and the corresponding probability of staying out of poverty is equal to 1
2 P[.
If experiencing poverty in 1 year is independent of whether the
household has been poor previously, then the probabilities in the form
of equation (5) can be multiplied together to obtain the joint probability
of following a certain income-dynamic path. However, we would expect
that the current level of family well-being is related to previous poverty
status, ρ, or the interhousehold variance σ 2µ is not zero; then the joint
probability must be calculated taking into account these correlations. The
generalization of equation (5) on the case of T years for the particular






Φ53 hBti 1 1 ρ(1 2 ρ)2
2.5
µi4 [2Yti 2 1]6 f (µ i)dµ i, (6)
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P(Yi), where i 5 1, . . . , N. (7)
The integral in equation (6) was approximated numerically using
hermite integration. The conditional probabilities for different socioeco-
nomic groups of households to exhibit certain types of income dynamics
were calculated based on equation (6) by the maximization of likelihood
function in the form of equation (7). Results of the estimations for
rounds 1–4, February 1992–November 1993, and similar results for
rounds 5–7, December 1994–October 1996, are presented in appendix
table A1. Estimations are based on the sample of 3,523 households with
14,037 observations for rounds 1–4 and on the sample of 2,417 house-
holds with 7,251 observation for rounds 5–7.
Demographic Category
Table 1, part A presents the simulation results for the distribution of in-
come dynamics for selected demographic categories. We divide all fami-
lies into six demographic categories: single-parent families (96% are sin-
gle-mother families in Russia), families with three or more children,
families headed by pensioners, nuclear families (those with two parents
and one or two children), families consisting only of prime-age adults
(adults between age 25 and retirement), and families that fall into none
of these categories. Important differences are clear. For example, single-
parent families are twice as likely to be persistently poor as nuclear fami-
lies are. Similarly, families with three or more children are in an even
worse situation. For them the probability of being persistently poor is
more than triple that of a nuclear family.
In contrast, families of pensioners and households that consist of
prime-age adults are in a much better position. Less than 1% of pension-
ers’ families are persistently poor. Almost 70% of them never experi-
enced poverty during the survey period. Families consisting only of
prime-age adults had the greatest likelihood of being placed in the al-
ways-rich category.
The poverty patterns vary markedly among groups. The groups
most likely to experience poverty tend not to encounter it in its most se-
vere forms. A fifth of the households with more than three children expe-
rienced poverty twice during the four rounds of phase 1. A meaningful
proportion of nuclear families (17.8%) also belong to this transitionally
poor category. In comparison, only 7.3% of pensioners’ families are
transitionally poor.
Overall, for the 14 months covered by rounds 1–4, two-thirds (60.6%)
TABLE 1
Simulation of the Distribution of Russian Households by Income Dynamics
Groupings
A. Rounds 1–4, September 1992–November 1993
Type of Income Dynamics
Three
Never Once Twice Rounds Always
Rich Poor Poor Poor Poor Poor
Family demographic:
Single mother 5 parent family* 3.2 23.2 25.5 21.4 16.3 10.1
Family with more than three
children† 2.5 15.7 22.3 22.8 20.6 15.8
Family of pensioners‡ 9.9 59.2 20.2 7.3 2.6 .7
Nuclear family§ 7.0 32.5 27.5 17.8 10.5 4.8
Family of prime-age adults 9.9 35.2 27.2 15.8 8.4 3.5
Other 7.6 38.4 26.1 15.3 8.6 4.0
Head of household employment
status:
Employed 7.5 33.8 26.4 16.9 10.3 5.1
Unemployed 5.2 31.2 26.1 18.7 12.3 6.4
Head of household education:
High school 6.9 44 24.1 13.5 7.7 3.7
Technical 7.4 35.9 25.6 16.2 9.9 5.0
University 13.1 42.2 24.3 12.8 6.0 2.3
Type of settlement:
Metropolitan 11.0 45.4 23.9 11.8 5.7 2.2
Other urban 7.7 37.5 25.3 15.5 9.3 4.7
Rural 7.5 44.7 23.9 13.1 7.3 3.4
B. Rounds 5–7, December 1994–October 1996
Type of Income Dynamics
Three
Never Once Twice Rounds
Rich Poor Poor Poor Poor
Family demographic:
Single mother 5 parent family* 4.5 24.1 27.3 24.8 19.3
Family with more than three children† 1.1 15.2 23.5 29.1 31.2
Family of pensioners‡ 13.6 49.2 23.9 10.1 3.3
Nuclear family§ 7.1 24.2 29.0 24.0 15.7
Family of prime-age adults 13.1 25.1 29.0 20.9 11.9
Other 7.7 28.5 28.8 21.7 13.4
Head of household employment status:
Employed 8.4 26.4 28.3 22.4 14.5
Unemployed 8.2 25.7 27.9 22.5 15.7
Head of household education:
High school 7.0 31.3 27.6 20.7 13.4
Technical 8.4 27.3 28.7 22.0 13.7
University 18.4 37.6 24.5 13.2 6.5
Type of settlement:
Metropolitan 27.8 43.2 19.2 6.9 2.0
Other urban 8.2 33.8 28.2 19.1 10.7
Rural 7.6 23.50 27.8 23.7 17.3
* Includes households with one prime-age female living with children and in some
cases with pensioners.
† Includes households that are not single-parent families.
‡ Includes families of pensioners.
§ Includes families with two parents and one or two children.
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of nuclear families experienced poverty at least once. The percent-
age increases to 73.5% among single-parent families; for families with
three or more children, the proportion is even higher (81.8%). Thus more
than 70% of Russian children have lived in households where needs ex-
ceeded income. Children suffer disproportionately from the conse-
quences of poverty.
The general relationships between poverty status and family demo-
graphic characteristics in the 1994–96 rounds (table 1b) are similar to
those in the first four rounds. Families with three or more children are
most likely and pensioners are least likely to be persistently poor. Al-
though the demographic family type is one of the major factors in de-
termining family income behavior, the contrast in probabilities of being
poor is less well-defined among the households from phase 1 that are
never poor, occasionally poor, and transitionally poor, as well as house-
holds that are never or occasionally poor during phase 2.
Education
The educational level of the household head, as expected, is important.
Tables 1a and 1b demonstrate the distribution of income by educational
status of the household head. The pattern observed in 1992–93 continues
in the second phase of the survey. Families in which the household head
holds a university degree are much less likely to be in poverty than fami-
lies with less-educated household heads, and they are more likely to be
classified as rich or never poor. However, the differences between the
income status of the household heads with high school and technical lev-
els of education are much smaller than might be expected. Once again,
as with the family demographic categories, education is not associated
with the income dynamic groupings for families with income below the
poverty line during one survey round.
Types of Settlement
As expected, families who live in Moscow or St. Petersburg are far less
likely to be poor and more likely to be classified as rich or never poor.
This is consistent with most economic data on new investment opportu-
nities and privatization patterns. These two cities, so far, are the main
recipients of foreign- and domestic-investment flows and the rates of job
formation and level of employment are much higher in Moscow and St.
Petersburg than in the rest of the country. Contrary to our expectations,
there was not a significant difference between residents of Moscow and
St. Petersburg in income dynamic patterns in our multivariate analysis,
so we grouped these two metropolitan areas.
In Russia, rural areas have traditionally lagged in their level of in-
come, even under the planned economy of the Soviet era.19 The income
disparity seems likely to grow based on our results. For the 1992–93 pe-
riod, urban households are slightly more likely to be persistently poor
Michael Lokshin and Barry M. Popkin 819
than rural households. The proportion of poor families in Moscow and
St. Petersburg is the lowest. For the second phase of the RLMS, the pov-
erty distribution is reversed; households from the rural areas are more
likely to be poor than those from urban and metropolitan areas. Persistent
and recurrent poverty in rural areas are six times more common than in
Moscow and St. Petersburg and about 60% more common than in the
other urban areas of Russia. Among relatively well-off households, the
biggest change between 1992–93 and 1994–96 is an increased likelihood
that more rich and fewer persistently poor households are found in met-
ropolitan areas.
Employment Status of Household Head
There are surprisingly small differences based on the employment status
of the household head. In both samples of the survey, the probability of
being persistently poor for households with unemployed heads is slightly
higher among families with an employed head.
Overall there are strong differences between the 1992–93 and the
1994–96 phases of the economic reform process. First, there is an obvi-
ously increased polarization in almost all categories of poverty. For ex-
ample, if in rounds 1–4 (table 1a) the probability of being persistently
poor for households with a high-school-educated head was approxi-
mately 60% higher than the probability for families headed by a univer-
sity graduate, in the second sample, the ratio of probabilities is equal to
2. The likelihood of being persistently poor for families from rural re-
gions of Russia is eight times higher than for households from Moscow
and St. Petersburg in rounds 5–7, and only 65% higher in rounds 1–4.
Chronically Poor
We focus further on the persistently poor group and examine the signifi-
cant education-demographic category relationships (fig. 5). Figure 6
shows the distribution of persistently poor Russians by type of settlement
for selected demographic categories. Figures 5 and 6 present the simula-
tions for education and type of settlement. There is a strong relationship
between the education level of the household head and the incidence of
chronic poverty. For the panel representing rounds 1–4, families headed
by single parents with a high school education or less are almost twice
as likely to be persistently poor as those headed by a university graduate.
The same relationship between poverty and education exists among nu-
clear families. Here, the likelihood of persistent poverty is more than
three times higher for households headed by someone with only a high-
school education than it is for families headed by a university-degree
holder. Analogous relationships are shown for households in rounds 5–
7 (fig. 5b).
Equally significant relationships exist between type of residence and
these demographic categories. Families headed by single parents from
Fig. 5.—Simulation. Proportion of persistently poor among households
headed by persons with different levels of education: (a) RLMS rounds 1–4
(September 1992–November 1993); (b) rounds 5–7 (December 1994–October
1996).
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Fig. 6.—Simulation. Proportion of persistently poor among households
with different residence types: (a) RLMS rounds 1–4 (September 1992–Novem-
ber 1993); (b) rounds 5–7 (December 1994–October 1996).
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Russia’s rural population is almost four times more likely to be persis-
tently poor than its urban population. Similar patterns hold for families
with more than two children. Data from rounds 5, 6, and 7 demonstrate
the same patterns, but the contrast between urban and rural areas is even
more marked.
V. Discussion
The current set of social protection institutions developed in the former
Soviet Union has not provided a meaningful level of protection against
poverty during this difficult period of reform. The reform process has
affected all groups in Russia. However, selected groups have experi-
enced quite different patterns of earning. It is our view that there are
groups that are affected mainly by macroeconomic shocks and others
that require more thorough attention to the long-term structural relation-
ships that affect their income-earning capacity. For example, wage ar-
rears or high inflation in certain months can temporarily bring the in-
come of a household with working adults below the poverty line, but for
families with single parents even stable wage payments would not be
enough to satisfy basic needs.
Figure 7a shows the distribution of the Russian poor by type of in-
come dynamics for phase 1 of the RLMS. The composition of the poor
varies significantly across the rounds of the survey. Over these four
rounds, 18%–33% of poor families were occasionally poor. We suppose
that the main reason this type of household experiences poverty is related
to macrochanges in the Russian economy. High inflation, arrears in wage
and pension payments, and large fluctuations in exchange rates could be
the factors that influenced these families’ incomes. As shown in the first
part of this article, the volatility of income is the highest for such house-
holds.
In contrast, for the groups of population that we designated as per-
sistently or recurrently poor, the stochastic macrocomponent presumably
was not the principal determinant of their income status. Analysis sug-
gests that microeconomic factors played a far greater role in the process
of income formation for these households. As we showed above, socio-
economic characteristics of persistently and recurrently poor households
are important factors affecting the probability that these families will ex-
perience poverty. Education of the household head, type of settlement,
and household demographic category have the highest significance in de-
fining income status for the chronically poor.
Figure 7b shows the distribution of poor Russian households by our
longitudinal categories of poverty. As in the first phase of the survey (fig.
7a), we observe heterogeneity in the dynamic structure of the Russian
poor over this period. A significant proportion of the population was per-
sistently poor during phase 2 of the RLMS. At the same time, more than
Fig. 7.—(a) Distribution of Russian poor by type of income dynamic,
RLMS rounds 1–4 (September 1992–November 1993); (b) Distribution of Rus-
sian poor by type of income dynamic, RLMS rounds 5–7 (December 1994–Oc-
tober 1996).
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a third of the poor households in each round were occasionally poor
overall.
In addition, it is clear that the composition of the Russian poor in
these last 2 years is different from that in 1992–93. There is a twofold
increase in the number of new households entering the ranks of the poor
from round 5 to round 7, and there is a corresponding decrease in the
proportion of persistently poor.
The sharp rise in poverty during 1994–96 explains a shift from the
relatively stable percentage of persistently poor in the 1992–93 sample
to the declining share of the persistently poor in the 1994–96 sample.
The shift may point to the beginning of a new stage in the transition of
the Russian economy. The high level of unemployment and the decline
in the level of government subsidies are two factors associated with the
new households that joined the ranks of the poor during the last two
years of the survey. Research is needed to understand this dynamic situa-
tion.
Data related to the demographic factors associated with poverty
from 1994–96 also show that the nature of poverty has changed. A num-
ber of actors such as residents in rural and urban areas other than Mos-
cow and St. Petersburg are much more likely to be linked with persistent
poverty in this 2-year period as compared to the 1992–93 period.
Overall, these results allow us to divide all Russian poor into three
groups by the type of factors affecting their income status. The first
group comprises households for which the fluctuations in family income
can be explained mostly by changes in the macroeconomic conditions.
These households are categorized as occasionally and transitionally poor
in phase 1, and occasionally poor in phase 2. For such families, preven-
tive policy measures should be designed that will secure minimum fam-
ily income in case of rapid changes in the macroeconomic environment.
Two important options may be developing policy measures that would
fill the financial gap by allowing temporarily poor households to smooth
their consumption needs by borrowing toward the future and repaying
the debt in periods of relative prosperity and using a system of financial
institutions that would provide low-interest loans.
Income of the households from the second group, those households
that are recurrently poor in phase 1 and transitionally poor in phase 2, is
affected by macro- and microeconomic changes in family living condi-
tions. Policies to eradicate poverty for such households should combine
measures to prevent and alleviate poverty. These measures should also
focus on financial support of poor households and on the improvement
of employment prospects for working family members and the increase
of earned income.
But it is the third group, the persistently poor, to whom special at-
tention must be paid. Moreover, as Duncan et al. note, ‘‘It is vital that
programs aimed at curing long-term poverty make such a distinction,
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based on knowledge of both who among the poor is most likely to re-
main poor as well as who among long-term poor would profit the most
from these programs. It makes little sense to devote scarce resources to
provide job training for someone who would have found a job quickly
in any case.’’20
The group facing persistent poverty should be most heavily targeted
by a system of programs aimed at eliminating the causes of their poverty.
These households are less likely to come out of poverty without essential
government subsidies and other structural remedies such as job training
and counseling. As we showed in the first part of this article, many
chronically poor families are unable to cover even half of their basic
needs. Much more radical measures in comparison to aid for other forms
of poverty are needed to help the permanently poor households meet
minimum requirements. Government intervention on structural and per-
sonal levels is needed to decrease the risk of Russian families falling into
permanent poverty. This intervention should combine financial support
of households through subsidies (monetary and in-kind) with measures
aimed at changing the structure of the labor market allow to stable em-
ployment opportunities for members of poor households.
It is clear that the nature of economic changes in Russia has had a
great deal to do with the current structure of income. The most rapid
growth of the private sector is in Moscow and St. Petersburg. Unless
there is a major shift in the nature of the economic change in Russia, the
gap between these regions and the rest of the country will only grow.
The results presented above should not be viewed as definitive
either in the categorization of the Russian poor or in providing unam-
biguous policy guidelines. They are best viewed as useful documentation
of empirical regularities—the so-called stylized facts of longitudinal sur-
vey experience. They can also be viewed as providing an introduction
to the study of poverty and income dynamics in the post-Soviet era in
Russia.
The dynamic nature of poverty and the fact that most of the Russian
households classified as poor by previous research are only temporarily
poor must be understood. These families move into and out of poverty,
which makes it possible to develop a new set of policies that aim for
poverty prevention rather than alleviation. We show that there are many
kinds of poverty rather than just one. Different groups of poor coexist in
Russian society, and their responses to social and economic shocks are
essentially different. New models for analyzing the reasons for and
causes of poverty can be used to construct fine-tuning antipoverty poli-
cies that will target differently every category of the poor.
The new social security system should be designed to be well-
adapted to the high risk of household financial hardship faced by Russian
families, and new proactive measures should be developed to prevent
poverty as well as to bring a poverty spell to an end more quickly. Under
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conditions of scarce financial and administrative resources, the problem
of the efficiency of the social safety nets becomes very important. The
problem of protecting the most vulnerable low-income groups of the
Russian population cannot be solved without creating policy mechanisms
that target this group.
To summarize the discussion above, the following conclusions can
be drawn:
1. The poor are a heterogeneous group with different types of pov-
erty coexisting in Russian society.
2. Only a small percentage of the Russian families experiencing
poverty during the reform period are persistently poor, while a large part
of the population moves in and out of poverty.
3. The persistently poor in Russia not only experience the longest
poverty spells, but they also have the lowest income and the smallest
probability of escaping poverty.
4. Groups with the highest volatility of income (those more affected
by macrochanges in the economy) are the transitionally and occasionally
poor.
5. There is a large component of the population whose income is
sufficient to cover basic needs.
6. Heterogeneity of the Russian poor is reflected in the differences
in major factors affecting the process of income formation among sub-
groups of the poor.
7. Families headed by single parents and families with three or more
children are overrepresented in low-income groups, especially among the
persistently poor.
8. Contrary to the prevailing view in Russia,21 the income of pen-
sioners is relatively high and the probability of being poor for families
of pensioners is low.
9. The majority of Russian children are affected by poverty.
TABLE A1




Rounds 1–4, September 1992–November 1993:
Demographic categories:
Number of children in the household .207 .072 2.890
Number of pensioners in the household 2.313 .032 29.875
Single parent family .178 .057 3.118
Family of pensioner 2.348 .084 24.126
Family with more than three children 2.128 .094 21.370
Nuclear family 2.322 .050 26.408




Family with unemployed household head .506 .058 8.736
Educational level of household head:
High schoool .207 .074 2.792
Technical or vocational .166 .063 2.624
University or higher Reference
Type of residence:
Metropolitan area 2.186 .061 23.033
Other urban areas 2.119 .075 21.594
Rural areas Reference
Age of household head:
18–23 years old 2.770 .119 26.451
23–30 years old .055 .093 .594
30–45 years old Reference
45–60 years old .311 .084 3.723
601 years old .127 .073 1.725
Time dummies:
Round 1 2.046 .036 21.306
Round 2 .413 .034 12.229
Round 3 2.119 .036 23.316
Round 4 Reference
Interaction terms:
Metro and high school 2.919 .115 27.985
Metro and technical 2.897 .094 29.594
Other urban and high school 2.826 .086 29.581
Other urban and technical 2.744 .083 28.984
ρ .411
Log-likelihood function 26463.140
Rounds 5–7, December 1994–October 1996:
Demographic categories:
Number of children in the household .140 .132 1.059
Number of pensioners in the household 2.262 .037 27.093
Single mother .154 .088 1.748
Family of pensioners 2.323 .105 23.069
Family with more than three children 2.044 .141 2.314
Nuclear family 2.150 .069 22.177




Family with unemployed head .554 .079 7.036
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TABLE A1 (Continued )
Standard
Coefficient Error t-ratio
Educational level of household head:
High schoool .069 .057 1.204
Technical or vocational 2.055 .068 2.813
University or higher Reference
Type of residence:
Metropolitan area 21.147 .140 28.208
Other urban areas 2.647 .068 29.562
Rural areas Reference
Age of household head:
18–23 years old 2.131 .099 21.323
23–30 years old 2.080 .058 21.390
30–45 years old Reference
45–60 years old 2.177 .044 24.004
601 years old .003 .099 .035
Time dummies:
Round 5 2.263 .039 26.821
Round 6 .036 .038 .954
Round 7 Reference
Interaction terms:
Metro and high school .096 .190 .504
Metro and technical .474 .193 2.455
Other urban and high school .464 .081 5.716




* Our calculations were made with a program kindly supplied to us by Dr.
David Guilkey.
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